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1. Introduction 
The aim of this paper is the investigation of the financial cycle and its potential 
interconnections and interdependencies with the fiscal position for G7 economies. 
The current financial and sovereign crisis, previous episodes of abrupt growth as 
well as financial stalls indicate that the sole investigation of the reasons affecting 
financial conditions and business cycles is not enough so as to evaluate and assess 
the several crises episodes emerged in the global economy. One of the major 
accusations for the economic profession during the latest crises is the inability of the 
modelling frameworks used to indicate the forthcoming financial meltdown and the 
ensuing fiscal burden for the troubled economies. There are a few studies examining 
the financial cycles and their properties, like Claessens et al. (2011), while others try 
to investigate the relation of business and financial cycles (see, Claessens et al. 2012 
and Tagkalakis 2013). 
In our work, we move one step further by incorporating in our modelling 
approach a number of aggregate indices, able to capture the financial conditions and 
the fiscal position of the economies under investigation. These are the so called 
financial and fiscal stress indices (hereafter FSI and FiscSI, respectively). Their major 
advantage is the broad coverage of stand-alone indicators, representing different 
sources of instability that can lead to episodes of financial upheaval and fiscal strain 
into one single variable. In this way, a much richer set of information is 
implemented, so that a more accurate depiction of the main threats of an economy’s 
stability can be provided. Additionally, the aforementioned indices are good 
representatives of the conditions prevailing in the financial cycles (FSI) and the fiscal 
stance of the scrutinized countries (FiscSI).  
A well-established causal relationship between the monetary and financial 
cycles with the business cycle is provided by Andrian et al. (2010). In that paper, the 
link of a flatter term spread with gloomier growth prospects, because of the credit 
expansion seizure, is established. Thus, our indices that represent the economic and 
financial conditions are good tools for the empirical investigation the 
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aforementioned relationships. Furthermore, the importance of such tools is stressed 
by Kastrop et al. (2012), where the authors discuss the efforts for the creation of a 
unified early warning indicators framework for the Euro Area countries, after the 
current crisis outbreak1. The scope of this new framework is the production of early 
signals for potential vulnerabilities on the fiscal, financial and sovereign sides of the 
economies. A special emphasis is attributed to the kind of institutional framework 
that allows the prompt application of the necessary macroeconomic policies for the 
alleviation of crises effects.  
We base our analysis into a SVAR model in order to estimate the effects of 
both financial and fiscal stress on four key macroeconomic variables; real GDP 
growth, inflation, short-term interest rates and nominal effective exchange rate. 
Using recursive ordering as well as pure sign restrictions, we explore the 
macroeconomic effects of unexpected shocks in the financial and fiscal conditions 
using quarterly data for the G7 economies. To the best of our knowledge this is the 
first attempt to analyse the interactions of financial and fiscal vulnerabilities through 
these indexes. To briefly illustrate our results, a shock in financial stress index is not 
always reflected in deteriorating fiscal conditions. The reverse is also true for a fiscal 
shock. Additionally, for almost all the examined cases, a sudden financial and fiscal 
shock affects negatively the output growth, inflation and interest rate. On contrary, 
the effects on exchange rates are mixed. Overall, it is a major step in the research 
agenda, towards a deeper understanding of how these crucial factors operate and 
affect the evolution of the economies around the world.  
The remaining paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides a review of 
the literature. Section 3 presents the data used along with a discussion about the 
construction of the indexes and the econometric methodology used. Section 4 
                                                          
1 Policy makers are extremely interested in these indexes, something evident from the intense 
research effort made by many central banks around the word, especially the Federal Reserve. Consult 
Hatzius et al. (2010) for more information. 
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discusses the estimated impulses responses and the historical decompositions. 
Section 5 provides further evidence and, finally, Section 6 discusses the results. 
 
2. Literature Background 
One of the most intensely debated issues in economics is the business cycles, 
their fluctuations and the respective effects on the level of economic growth. Many 
economists have investigated their behaviour, tipping points as well as the exact 
timing of the shift from one phase of the cycle to the next one. On the other hand, 
there is a strand of economic literature growing lately, the purpose of which is the 
examination of the so-called financial cycles. This kind of research was amplified 
due to the incidence of the recurring financial crises. Especially, given the current 
financial and sovereign crisis that hit the developed economies and, most recently, 
the Euro Area countries, the interest on this topic is inflated again.  
One of the first papers providing stylised facts of the financial cycles is 
Claessens et al. (2011). The authors analyse the financial cycles for 21 advanced 
economies for the last half century. The innovative feature here is the decomposition 
of the financial cycle to credit, house and equity prices cycles, according to the type 
of variables used. According to their analysis, the financial cycles downturns are 
more intensive, lasting between five and eight quarters, while the upturns are longer 
and slower. Additionally, the equity and house prices cycles are more pronounced 
than the credit ones. At a cross sectional level, it holds for the credit and equity 
cycles. In general, the global synchronization of downturns leads to longer and 
deeper recessions.  
Based on this work, Claessens et al. (2012) proceed to an investigation of the 
financial and business cycles interactions. Their research covers a period of fifty 
years again, from 1960 to 2010, with forty four countries included to their sample. 
An interesting finding is the strong ties between the different phases of the two types 
of cycles. An association between exacerbated recessions and the house and equity 
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prices is established. How smooth is the process of transition from the recession to 
the recovery phase is directly linked with the financial cycle. In this way, the authors 
emphasise the role of the financial assets on the real economy. In general, financial 
cycles are sharper and deeper than the business ones, while both exhibit bigger 
swings in emerging markets than in the developed economies. 
On a similar fashion, Drehmann et al. (2012) provide concurrent evidence with 
the previously mentioned economists, concerning the house and equity prices 
fluctuations. They specify the duration of the financial cycles to be about sixteen 
years, following an increasing tendency since the mid 1980’s. In a similar vein, 
Kannan (2012) study the effects on the economy’s recovery phase from a 
recessionary period, when the latter is the outcome of a financial crisis incidence. His 
research is based on industry – level data, specializing on firms that heavily rely on 
external finance for their operations. The empirical work provides evidence that 
recessions induced by financial upheavals cause higher output losses, by 10 to 15 
percent, in industrialized economies. Moreover, the recovery period is more 
prolonged, compared to the case where a recession is not caused by financial sector 
abnormalities. The author provides a number of reasons for this phenomenon, 
namely the nature of the financial crisis, the size of shock to the potential output of 
the economy or the external environment. 
Another part of this literature has tried to empirically assess the 
aforementioned interconnections. Chen et al. (2012), using a multivariate unobserved 
component model, study the interest rates, output, asset prices and credit nexus for 
the US economy. According to their results, these variables’ cycles are closely related 
and concurrent. Moreover, Karfakis (2013) study the relationship of credit and 
business cycles for Greece, in the last decade. Real GDP represents the business cycle 
behaviour, while the real credit is made of the aggregate claims on the private sector 
of the economy. One of the outcomes is that credit is a useful indicator for 
monitoring future changes in the Greek business cycle. Additionally, credit drying 
up during the recent crisis is a factor that deepened the recession.  
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Tagkalakis (2013) investigate the effects of financial market crises on the fiscal 
positions of 20 OECD countries, for the period 1990 – 2010. The most important 
finding is a significant deterioration of fiscal durability during financial crises. 
Especially for economies with well developed financial markets, these effects are 
stronger, in terms of lost output. In these cases the fiscal interventions are bigger, 
while there is a positive relation of financial market crashes with debt levels 
deterioration.  
As it is evident from this literature, our financial stress indices constitute a 
good representation of the financial cycle. There is a wide coverage of the financial 
markets, achieved through the inclusion of variables representing the credit, equity 
and asset prices conditions. In this way, our financial stress indexes are an efficient 
metric of the financial markets conditions. On the other hand, it is imperative to 
provide a similar metric, which can represent the conditions prevailing to the fiscal 
stance of an economy. As it is evident from the current sovereign crisis that has hit 
hard many Euro Area countries, governments are in need of tools able to provide 
them with early warnings of future fiscal strains and imbalances. Since, to a great 
extent, the business cycle behaviour is defined by the countries fiscal conditions, we 
provide a number of fiscal stress indices in this paper. In the following, we provide a 
discussion of the relevant literature. 
One of the very first papers, indicating the importance of monitoring the 
evolution of a broad spectrum of fiscal conditions indicators, is the one by Hemming 
and Petrie (2000). The importance of fiscal sustainability is emphasized, based on 
theoretical and practical policy considerations providing a number of metrics that 
can, potentially, provide useful insights in public finances. In terms of the criteria for 
choosing the vulnerability indicators, they suggest doing it according to the initial 
fiscal position of an economy, the short-term fiscal risks, the long-term sustainability 
and the respective structural weaknesses. For the initial fiscal position, they suggest 
the overall fiscal balance to GDP ratio and net financial debt to GDP. For the case of 
short-term fiscal risks, the maturity and the currency composition of debt are 
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proposed. The changes in primary balance and demographic changes projections are 
the indicators able to outline the long-term fiscal sustainability. Finally, for the 
structural fragilities of an economy, the recommended measures are the expenditure 
indicators (like military expenditure/GDP) and some revenue indicators (revenue 
composition, tax elasticity, non-tax revenue as a share of total revenue). 
Although the Hemming and Petrie’s work provides interesting insights and 
theoretical justifications for the proposed fiscal sustainability indicators, it does not 
move forward to a methodology for the construction of composite fiscal stress 
indicators. This is done by Baldacci et al. (2011a), where the authors provide a set of 
variables as early warning indicators of fiscal strain and rollover risk that can be 
included in a relevant aggregate index. Their contribution is the development of a 
fiscal monitoring framework, through the construction of two aggregate indices 
(namely, a fiscal vulnerability and a fiscal stress index)2.  
Using this framework, Baldacci et al. (2011b) have produced fiscal stress 
indexes for both advanced and emerging economies. Using annual data for the 
period 1970 – 2010, they find that the best predictors of fiscal turmoils for advanced 
economies are the gross financing needs and the fiscal solvency risks variables. 
Regarding the emerging economies, the most important factors are the public debt 
structure and the spillover risks from the international financial markets. Focusing 
on the current crisis, the authors provide evidence of heightening fiscal stress for 
both groups of countries, while the leaders of this increase are Europe and North 
America3.  
Since the concept of fiscal stress indicators has only recently been developed, 
the lack of empirical applications is sensible. Another recent paper using such 
indices is Berti et al. (2012). Here, the signalling approach is used in order to 
construct fiscal stress indexes for the EU and nine more advanced economies. They 
                                                          
2 The theoretical framework is found at the work of Cottarelli (2011), where the three major reasons of 
government’s rollover risks are analysed.   
3 Schaechter et al. (2012) provide a good example of how this kind of research can be used for policy 
making.   
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include a number of macro-financial and competitiveness variables from those used 
by the EU policymakers. According to the empirical findings, the chosen variables 
perform well as leading indicators of fiscal stress episodes. Also, the results are 
improved whenever the aggregate stress indexes are incorporated to the model, 
compared to the single indicators. 
 
3. Methodology 
3.1 The Financial and Fiscal Stress Indices 
We compute a number of financial and fiscal stress indices. These indexes are 
used in the empirical analysis in the next section. Their major advantage, compared 
to stand alone indicators, is the ability to capture different sources of instability that 
can lead to episodes of financial turmoils and fiscal strain, into one single variable. 
Thus, a more accurate representation of the economic and financial conditions is 
offered, while the effects of many different financial markets (in the case of the FSIs) 
and fiscal vulnerability indicators (in the case of FiscSIs) are offered. Thus, we are 
capable of empirically investigating the relationships between financial and fiscal 
stress. 
In more detail, the financial stress indexes are constructed followed the equal-
variance approach, propagated by Cardarelli et al. (2008, 2011). According to this, the 
FSI is a composite indicator, in which each variable is added with its standardized 
value. That is, we deduct the mean and divide by its standard deviation. In this way, 
measurement problems are avoided, while the contribution of each single indicator 
is measured to deviations from its mean value. Finally, we assign an equal weight to 
each one of the contributors to the aggregate index. Even if the relevant literature is 
abundant of different methodologies in the index aggregation, it is evident that the 
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equal–variance approach is as efficient as any other methodology, in terms of the 
accurate depiction of financial stress episodes4. 
The variables included here are factors representing uncertainty in the 
markets, like the banking sector beta. This is calculated as the ratio of the moving 
covariance of year-over-year percentage change of each country’s banking sector 
equity index, with the general equity index, over the moving variance of the general 
stock index. Then, the TED spread is the difference between the uncovered (3-month 
LIBOR) and covered (respective Treasury bill rate) investments for the interbank 
markets. Additionally, the inverted term spread (Treasury bill rate difference from 
the long-term government bond yield) is used. Both are important liquidity risk 
indicators. Corporate bond spread, defined as the yield difference of the long-term 
corporate bonds from the governmental ones, together with stock returns and the 
stock returns volatility (calculated as a GARCH(1,1) model of the general equity 
index, modelled as an autoregressive process with 12 lags) are the securities markets 
indicators. Finally, the real effective exchange rate volatility is also included. In a 
nutshell, the mathematical representation of the financial stress index is the 
following: 
 
FSI  TED spread  Inverted term spread  
           Corporate Bond spread Stock market returns  Stock market volatility
           Exchange rate market volatility
β= + + +
+ + +  (1) 
Turning to the fiscal stress indices, the aggregation approach is similar, while 
the metrics involved are representative of the three important characteristics; 1) the 
fiscal burden of the economy, 2) the long term trends on their fiscal position (based 
on the fertility rate and the governmental funding needs for social security issues) 
and 3) each country’s financing needs. Based on the work of Baldacci et al. (2011a) 
and the data availability for the countries included in this study, our indices consist 
                                                          
4 An excellent survey of the aggregation approaches for the financial stress indices is provided by 
Kliesen et al. (2012). 
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of five variables. In the first case, the difference of the government debt payments 
rate (r) from the growth rate of the economy (g). This indicator offers a clear idea of 
the degree of economy’s solvency and whether or not it is close to a fiscal crisis. 
Apparently, an economy needs to service its debt obligations and its ability to do it 
depends on the level of its growth rate. Then, we also include the general 
government structural balance, which is defined as the cyclically adjusted balance, 
including any temporary revenue or expenditure items. Finally, the general 
government net debt is calculated as the difference between the gross debt of the 
country from any relevant financial assets that correspond to debt instruments. All 
three variables are expressed as percentages of the country’s GDP. 
The last two variables concern the long term fiscal trends. Here, total fertility 
rate and the old age dependency ratio are used. The former is the average number of 
children per woman, while the latter reflects the projected calculations for the share 
of population that will be over 65 in the next 30 years, as a percentage of the total 
adult population. Both variables are crucial because they offer projections on the tax 
base of the economies, together with the number of people able to contribute to the 
fiscal sustainability of a country, through their contribution to the healthcare and 
pension systems. 
The aggregation method is similar to the one followed for the financial stress 
index. The only difference is that the mean and the standard deviation used are the 
10-year peer group average. This formula can shortly be written as follows: 
 
 FiscSI ( )  structural balance  net debt + fertility rate  depedency ratior g= − + + +  (2) 
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Our sample is the G7 economies; Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, United 
Kingdom and United States. The dataset consists of quarterly observations, covering 
a period from the beginning of 1980’s until the second quarter of 20095. 
In order to verify whether our indices work well as timely indicators of the 
prevailing conditions in the financial markets and the fiscal condition of an 
economy, we plot them in two separate graphs. Figure 1 depicts the G7 financial 
stress indexes, while Figure 2 the fiscal stress ones. Regarding Figure 1, it is easy to 
observe a strong co-movement of the indices throughout the period examined. There 
are some variations, though, especially in periods where a financial crises episode hit 
specific economies. For instance, Italy and UK stress indices achieved their, second 
to the current crisis, highest values during the ERM crisis period, while the Asian 
crisis of 1997–99 has strongly affected all the economies of our sample. Without any 
doubt, the biggest effect on G7 financial conditions is the one from the current 
financial crisis that initiated in 2007. 
Put Figure 1 here 
Especially after the third quarter of 2008, which coincides with the Lehman Brothers 
collapse, the stress indexes reach their most extreme values. The level of financial 
stress at that period was unprecedented and it justifies the decision of the 
governments to heavily intervene in the financial markets. Gradually, the indexes 
decrease towards the end of the sample period. Nevertheless, they still remain in 
relatively high stress level. 
A similar situation is observed in Figure 2. In all cases, the fiscal conditions of 
the G7 countries significantly deteriorated during the current crisis. It is also evident 
that this deterioration has begun earlier for most of the economies. Probably, this is a 
sign of the troubled public finances the developed economies face, due to a number 
of reasons, such as the ageing population and the anaemic rates of growth. Japan is 
                                                          
5 In some cases, some annual observations were interpolated into quarters. Depending on the country, 
the dataset range varies. The time period examined is until 2009Q2 due to data limitations. 
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an interesting case, since it seems to be quite prudent during the previous three 
decades but, in the last ten years, its fiscal position becomes gradually worse than 
most of the rest. Canada and Germany, although affected by the current crisis, 
Put Figure 2 here  
they successfully managed their macroeconomic imbalances. On the other hand, UK 
has improved its performance only in the last decade, while France and USA were 
always more fiscally vulnerable that the other economies of the group.  
3.2. Related SVAR Literature and Model Specification 
Apart from its domination in literature concerning the effect of monetary policy, 
SVAR analysis has become the empirical tool for investigating the effects of fiscal 
policy as well. Caldara and Kamps (2008) provide an extensive survey of this 
literature. In spite of a great number of different model specifications, only a small 
proportion of papers go beyond the study of fiscal policy. More precisely, an 
interesting topic is the examination of interrelations between fiscal variables and the 
financial stress as measured by the FSI. Afonso et al. (2011) examine how fiscal and 
financial shocks affect the macroeconomy. In this study, the distinction between low 
and high financial stress periods is captured by employing a threshold VAR model 
for the US, UK, Italy and Germany. Among their outcomes, they find that economic 
growth responds positively to fiscal shocks in both regimes. On the other hand, 
growth has a negative response to financial shocks.  
In a related paper, which, however, does not belong to the fiscally related 
VAR literature, Mallick and Sousa (2013) examine the macroeconomic impact of 
monetary policy and financial stress shocks. Using two alternative SVAR 
identification methods, their results support the negative growth effects from a 
financial shock. In this study, we work on a similar framework. Employing a SVAR 
model, we try to look into the effects of both financial and fiscal shocks. The 
structural VAR model is written as: 
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 0 1 1( )t t tAX A A L X Be−= + +  (3) 
Xt is the vector of the 6 endogenous variables given by Xt=[ ft, st, yt, πt, it, nt], where ft 
is the FSI, st is the FiscSI, yt is the growth of real GDP, πt is the inflation rate,  it is the 
short-term interest rate6 and nt is the nominal effective exchange rate (NEER, 
hereafter)7. A is the matrix of autoregressive coefficients of order 6x6 and et is the 
vector of structural disturbances. We estimate the VAR model setting p=4 lags as this 
is the most appropriate choice for quarterly data. Using the number of lags, 
determined by the Schwarz and Hannan-Quinn criteria, does not change the results8. 
 Following Cover and Mallick (2012) we use a recursive causal structure so as 
to impose the necessary number of restrictions that enables to estimate the SVAR. 
This particular ordering reveals our assumptions.  Firstly, we assume that a FSI 
shock can be quickly transmitted to all sectors of the economy. This means that all 
the examined variables start to respond in the first quarter. In this way, the FSI is 
ordered as first variable. Secondly, we assume that an unexpected increase in the 
FiscSI starts to affect the growth rate, the inflation, the interest rate and the nominal 
effective exchange rates at the same quarter. The FiscSI shock affects the FSI after one 
quarter. So, the FiscSI is order as second variable in the SVAR model. Consequently, 
we assume that growth shocks affect at the same period the inflation and the interest 
rate as well as the nominal effective exchange rates. However, the effects of growth 
shocks affect the financial and fiscal stress indexes after one quarter; the growth rate 
is ordered as third variable. Furthermore, inflation shocks affect simultaneously only 
interest rates and exchange rates. Similarly, interest rates shocks affect 
simultaneously only the exchange rates. So inflation and interest rates are ordered as 
                                                          
6 All data, apart from FSI and FiscSI which are constructed by us, come from International Financial 
Statistics provided by the IMF. The inflation is the GDP deflator. As short term interest rates we used 
the money market rates. Only for the case of France we used the treasury bill rates. The data for 
NEER are taken from the BIS database. 
7 We use this variable so as to take into account foreign exchange market shocks. We thank an 
anonymous referee for indicating this aspect.  
8 In order to save space, we present only the former estimates. 
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the fourth and the fifth variable, respectively. Finally, we assume that the exchange 
rate shocks affect all the examined variables only with one lag. Assuming that εt are 
the reduced-form residuals and et are the structural shocks the recursive 
identification scheme can be summarised as:   
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where xij’s are the coefficients to be estimated.  
4. Empirical Evidence 
4.1 The effects of financial stress shock    
We start our analysis focusing on the effects of a positive one standard deviation FSI 
shock on growth rates. For almost all countries a drop of growth is detected. For 
Germany, Italy, UK and US the reduction is sudden and the equilibrium is restored 
around 7 quarters later. For Japan the drop in growth rates is smoother and its 
duration is longer as it lasts for 12 quarters. For Canada the response of growth to a 
FSI shock remains around zero for 4 quarters after the shock. After that period a 
small increase takes place. The only exception is France where an increase of growth 
for 4 quarters is observed. After that period, the growth drops and after the 12th 
quarter starts returning back to the equilibrium. The general picture of the above 
analysis is that a shock in the financial stress affects negatively growth rates. These 
results are consistent with economic theory and recent facts. Increasing financial 
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stress reflects on the credit conditions of the economy. Therefore, the liquidity 
shortages abruptly affect the real economy and, thus, economic growth9. 
 The responses of inflation rates are also quite common across G7 economies. 
For Canada, France, Italy and US a significant drop of the inflation is observed. The 
equilibrium levels are restored around 9 quarters after the shock. UK experiences the 
most significant drop which reaches its maximum after 10 quarters. The only 
exception is Germany and Japan for which an increase takes place. However, this 
increase is mostly insignificant. Overall, the majority of the findings are sensible; the 
financial meltdown affects negatively the economic activity and the corresponding 
prospects. Consequently, this has an inverse effect on inflation. 
 Additionally, the impact on interest rates is also uniform across G7 
economies; a decrease that is followed by an increase. More precisely, a decrease is 
observed for Canada, Italy, Japan, UK and US. In all these cases, the equilibrium is 
achieved after the period of 10th quarter. Only in Canada the interest rate is back to 
its pre-shock level 4 quarters after the shock. For France and Germany the initial 
drop is not significant. Interestingly, we observe an increase in the interest rates after 
8 and 11 quarters after the shock. Overall, we can claim that this outcome is a good 
depiction of the central banks’ reaction after 2008; the interest rates gradually 
reduced. 
 Lastly, one standard deviation FSI shock causes the nominal effective 
exchange rate of UK pound and of US dollar to decrease. On the other hand, the 
corresponding value of the Japanese Yen is increased. On contrary the effects to the 
effective exchange rates of Euro (as this is reflected by the responses of France, 
Germany and Italy) and Canadian dollar are insignificant.  
 We now focus our analysis on the effects of a positive FSI shock on FiscSI. 
We assume that such a shock reflects the effects of an unexpected change in the 
                                                          
9 We also estimate our SVAR model, using IMF FSIs. The results remain similar and are available 
upon request. 
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financial conditions over the current fiscal position. The estimated effects are 
characterised by large differences. For Canada, France, Germany and Italy the 
impulse response of the FiscSI die out very quickly with the whole movement being 
statistically insignificant. On the other hand, for UK and US economies a positive 
shock in FSI causes increasing FiscSI. This effect reaches its peak 7 quarters after the 
shock with the US response being more persistent than the UK one. Lastly, the case 
of Japan seems quite peculiar. The impulse response shows a constant decrease from 
the beginning without dying out. Despite this bizarre effect, the significant outcomes 
are in accordance to our expectation; a deterioration of the financial conditions 
reflects on the economies’ fiscal stance. This is evident from the aftermath of the 
2007-2009 financial crisis where the UK and US governments were forced to bail out 
the troubled financial institutions. As a result, the governmental balance sheets were 
heavily aggravated. 
 
      Put Figures 3-9 here 
 
4.2 The effects of fiscal stress shock  
We now stress our attention to the effects caused by an unexpected shock in the 
FiscSI. In a similar vein, the shocks of FiscSI are interpreted as unexpected changes 
of the prevailing fiscal conditions. These kinds of shocks may come from sudden 
changes in one or more index’s components.  
Focusing on the response of growth, a negative effect takes place. The most 
significant responses are observed for Canada, France, Japan and US. On average the 
negative effects die out after the first half of the examined periods. Like in the case of 
FSI shock, the growth is retarded whenever the economy experiences sudden fiscal 
strains. 
 As far as the response of inflation is concerned, all countries experience a 
decrease after the FiscSI shock. For Canada, Germany, UK, US the inflation rate 
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constantly remain below the initial equilibrium levels. For France and Italy the 
initially reduced inflation increases after the 4th and 6th quarter, respectively. After 
reaching a peak, the responses tend to long-term level.  Regarding the response of 
interest rate, Canada, Italy, Japan, UK and US experience a decrease in their interest 
rates. However, for Germany and France the response is mostly insignificant.   
Furthermore, the value of the Canadian and American dollar decreases. The 
same is true for British pound decreases reaching the equilibrium just after 6 
quarters. On the other hand, the value of Euro and the Yen remains the same; the 
oscillations around zero are insignificant.  
Regarding the financial conditions, the most responsive indexes are those of 
Germany and UK. While for the UK the effects seem to remain at a constant level 
after the 3rd quarter, an increasing trend appears for Germany. An increase is also 
observed for Italy. However, this initial increase lasts for 4 quarters, and 
subsequently the effect is reduced and gradually dies out. For US, Japan and France 
an initial increase is observed as well. Nevertheless, these effects remain 
insignificant. The only negative response is related to Canada; again this result is 
also insignificant for the examined period. Based on the above outcomes we observe 
that, at least of some of the G7 economies, the sovereign risks are related with the 
state of their financial markets.  
 
4.3 Historical Decompositions 
Beyond the impulse response analysis described above, we provide further evidence 
based on the historical decompositions. The purpose is to explore the individual 
contributions of financial and fiscal shocks to macroeconomic variables. To facilitate 
the comparisons we report the historical decompositions of the G7 economies for the 
three most important variables10. Figure 10 shows the contributions of FSI shock (red 
                                                          
10  We have omitted the corresponding diagrams for the NEER. The corresponding percentages were 
very small. The results are available upon request.  
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bar) and FiscSI shock (green bar) to growth (blue line) across G7 economies. The 
right-hand side column measures the percentage of each contribution, while the left-
hand side represents the rate of change. Firstly, our results suggest that both shocks 
have contributed to fluctuations of growth rates. This holds for all economies apart 
from Canada, where the fiscal shock has much stronger contribution than the 
financial one. Interestingly, for the latest quarters (2007Q3-2009:Q1) of our sample 
we observe that both financial and fiscal shocks have a negative contribution. So, 
during the period of financial crisis both shocks seem to have a dampening role to 
growth rates. 
Put Figure 10 here 
 Figure 11 presents the historical decompositions for inflation. The general 
message is that fiscal shocks have a positive contribution when the inflation rises 
and a negative one when it falls, especially in Canada, Germany, Italy and Japan. 
Lastly, Figure 12 shows the corresponding decompositions for interest rates. 
Canada’s short term interest rates seem to be mainly affected by fiscal shocks, while 
the French interest rates are mostly driven by financial shocks. For the remaining 
economies, both shocks contribute in a time-varying nature.  
 
Put Figure 11 here 
Put Figure 12 here 
 
5. Robustness and Further Evidence  
5.1 Testing for Over-identifying Restrictions 
The analysis so far is based on a recursive identification scheme that was 
summarised by the equation (4). We now test for over-identifying restrictions. 
Firstly, we assume that a sudden increase in financial stress is not immediately 
transmitted to the fiscal stress indicator (x21=0). Secondly, we assume that a shock in 
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financial conditions does not affect the growth rate at the same period (x31=0). Our 
third assumption is that monetary conditions, which are reflected by the response of 
interest rates, start to react only one period after a financial or fiscal shock (x51=x52=0). 
The last step is to test these 4 assumptions at the same time (x21= x31= x51=x52=0). Under 
this assumption, the restricted version of equation (4) is now written as: 
11
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                   = =                      
                                (5) 
Table 1 summarises the p-values of the above restrictions. For almost all cases, the 
null that the over-identifying restrictions are true is not rejected at 10% level. The 
impulse responses computed for the restricted version are actually the same with the 
ones reported in Figures 3-911.  
 
5.2 Sign Restrictions  
As a robustness check we follow a different identifying approach. Instead of 
assuming a specific ordering, we put certain restrictions on the impulse response 
functions, employing the pure sign restrictions method of Uhlig (2005). Given that 
our main focus is the macroeconomic consequences of financial and fiscal shocks we 
assume a positive sign on both FSI and FiscSI shocks. More precisely, a positive 
restriction is placed on both indexes for a period of three quarters. Given this 
assumption we focus on the responses of the remaining variables. Figures 10-16 
show the median impulse responses along with the 16th and 84th quantiles. Starting 
from growth rates, the empirical results suggest a significant drop for Canada, Italy, 
Japan, UK and US. For Germany and France the drop is mostly insignificant. The 
                                                          
11 To save space we do not report these impulse responses.  
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results are also in accordance with the previous findings when we examine the 
response of the inflation. For almost all cases the inflation rates are reduced. 
However, the period when these negative effects die out is not the same across 
countries. Furthermore, for Germany an increase is observed. This result is also 
consistent with the previous evidence based on the recursive ordering. The same is 
also true for France.  
 Regarding interest rate responses, in the majority of the examined countries, 
interest rates decrease. This is again consistent with the precious findings. 
Interestingly, for Canada, Italy, and Japan the interest rates remain below the 
equilibrium for the whole examined period. For UK and US the effects die out 17 
and 10 quarters after shock, respectively. For Germany and France the responses 
remain insignificant. The only kind of responses that vary across countries is the 
responses of the nominal effective exchange rates. For France, Germany and Japan 
an increase of exchange rate is observed. On contrary, we find a negative response 
for Canada and Italy. For UK, a small decrease takes place immediately after the 
shocks but 13 quarters later an increase is observed. For the US the mean response 
remain close to zero indicating no significant effect for the exchange rate.  
     Put Figures 10-16 here 
Based on the above findings, we perform two alternative sign restrictions. This is 
done in order to examine the interactions between FSI and FiscSI. Firstly, we impose 
a positive FSI shock. We additionally assume that this shock affects negatively both 
growth and interest rates. The results suggest that in all cases, the FSI shock causes 
an increase to the FiscSI. Secondly, we assume a positive FiscSI shock assuming 
again that growth and interest rates respond negatively. In this case, in four out of 
seven cases (Canada, Germany, UK, US), we find an increased response of the FSI. 
Overall, we observe that financial stress is transmitted directly to fiscal stress in all 
examined economies, while the opposite is not always the case.   
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6. Discussion and Conclusions 
In this paper we examine the macroeconomic effects from a financial and a fiscal 
stress shock as well as the interactions between these two sectors. The current crisis 
indicates that the sole investigation of financial and fiscal conditions is not enough 
for a well-rounded assessment of the global crisis episodes. In order to evaluate 
these two kinds of shocks we construct a financial stress indicator and the 
corresponding fiscal one for the G7 economies. In this way, we can assess the level 
and the evolution through time of the prevailing conditions of financial and fiscal 
sectors. The indexes perform quite well, based on their success to capture past and 
recent crisis episodes.  
The analysis is based on a SVAR model. We use two different identification 
methods; a recursive ordering and pure sign restrictions. Our results reveal that 
transmission of a financial shock to fiscal sector and the opposite is not so 
pronounced. Additionally, we look into the effects on GDP growth, inflation, short-
term interest rates and exchange rates. The results suggest a negative response of 
growth to a sudden increase of both stress indicators. For the majority of the G7 
economies these responses are persistent.  
On the same vein, inflation rate respond negatively to both financial and fiscal 
shocks. Especially, in the case of excessive financial stress the inflation significantly 
drops. Regarding the interest rates, we observe that a fiscal deterioration dampens 
their level. The same holds for the case of increasing financial stress. However, after 
some period they tend to increase. Finally, the results for the nominal effective 
exchange rate are rather mixed. A clear negative effect exists only for US dollar and 
UK pound.  
In general our study emphasises the importance of financial and fiscal 
vulnerabilities in the developed economies. Especially, the negative effects of the 
previously mentioned shocks to the real economy constitute an additional important 
reason to focus on policies able to contain their impact. The current efforts to 
22 
 
formulate adequate macro-prudential policies together with the potential 
implementation of fiscal rules show that policy makers realise the existence of the 
complex dynamics between the financial and fiscal sectors. It would be interesting to 
extend this work through the examination of the potential transmission of financial 
and fiscal vulnerabilities across economies.  
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Figures 
Figure 1: G7 Financial Stress Indices 
 
Data Sources: Authors’ calculations 
 
Figure 2: G7 Fiscal Stress Indices 
 
Data Sources: Authors’ calculations 
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Figure 3: Canada Impulse Responses using recursive ordering 
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Figure 4: France Impulse Responses using recursive ordering 
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Figure 5: Germany Impulse Responses using recursive ordering 
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Figure 6: Italy Impulse Responses using recursive ordering 
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Figure 7: Japan Impulse Responses using recursive ordering 
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
Response of FIN to FiscSI Shock
-2
-1
0
1
2
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
Response of FiscSI to FSI Shock
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
Response of Growth to FSI Shock
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
Response of Growth to FiscSI Shock
-.4
-.2
.0
.2
.4
.6
.8
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
Response of Inflation to FSI Shock
-.4
-.2
.0
.2
.4
.6
.8
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
Response of Inflation to FiscSI Shock
-.8
-.4
.0
.4
.8
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
Response of Interest Rate to FSI Shock
-.8
-.4
.0
.4
.8
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
Response of Interest Rate to FiscSI Shock
-.08
-.04
.00
.04
.08
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
Response of NEER to FSI Shock
-.08
-.04
.00
.04
.08
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
Response of NEER FiscSI Shock
Response to Structural One S.D. Innovations ± 2 S.E.
 
 
32 
 
Figure 8: UK Impulse Responses using recursive ordering 
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Figure 9: US Impulse Responses using recursive ordering 
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Figure 10: Historical Decompositions of Growth Rates  
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Figure 11: Historical Decompositions of Inflation Rates  
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Figure 12: Historical Decompositions of Interest Rates  
Canada 
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Figure 13: Canada Impulse Responses using pure sign restrictions 
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Figure 14: France Impulse Responses using pure sign restrictions 
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Figure 15: Germany Impulse Responses using pure sign restrictions 
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Figure 16: Italy Impulse Responses using pure sign restrictions 
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Figure 17: Japan Impulse Responses using pure sign restrictions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Impulse Responses for FSI 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 -0.50 
-0.25 
0.00 
0.25 
0.50 
0.75 
Impulse Responses for FiscSI 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 -0.25 
0.25 
0.75 
1.25 
1.75 
Impulse Responses for Growth 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 -1.20 
-1.00 
-0.80 
-0.60 
-0.40 
-0.20 
-0.00 
0.20 
Impulse Responses for Inflation 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 -0.50 
-0.40 -0.30 
-0.20 -0.10 
-0.00 0.10 
0.20 0.30 
Impulse Responses for Interest Rate 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 -0.70 
-0.60 -0.50 
-0.40 -0.30 
-0.20 -0.10 
-0.00 0.10 
Impulse Responses for NEER 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 -0.02 
0.00 
0.02 
0.04 
0.06 
0.08 
50 
 
 
 
Figure 18: UK Impulse Responses using pure sign restrictions 
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Figure 19: US Impulse Responses using pure sign restrictions 
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Tables 
 
Table 1: Testing Over-Identifying Restrictions 
 p-values 
Assumptions: Canada France Germany Italy Japan UK US 
 
1.x21=0 
 
0.236 
 
0.365 
 
 
0.924 
 
 
0.686 
 
0.192 
 
0.139 
 
0.144 
2. x31=0 
 
0.648 0.178 0.434 0.070 0.982 0.023 0.008 
3.x51=x52=0 
 
0.202 0.156 0.620 0.758 0.084 0.152 0.010 
4. x21= x31= x51=x52=0 0.315 0.235 0.855 0.338 0.153 0.041 0.008 
Note: The entries show p-values for the null hypothesis depicted in the first column.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
